Introduction
It is generally understood that economic forecasters may have incentives to act strategically in the sense of seeking to enhance their reputations (see, e.g., Lamont (2002) , Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) , Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) , inter alia). For example, Lamont (2002, p. 265) notes that besides minimizing squared forecast errors, agents may set their forecasts to 'optimize pro…ts or wages, credibility, shock value, marketability, political power...'. Much of the empirical literature on testing the in ‡uence of factors other than accuracy on the determination of agents' forecasts rests on the notion of herding -whether forecasters take into account the views of others when they produce their forecasts. This may be manifest in forecasters skewing their optimal forecast towards the consensus view, or arti…cially exaggerating the di¤erence between their forecast and the consensus, where optimal is to be understood in the narrow sense of maximizing the expected accuracy of the forecast (for example, minimizing the expected squared forecast error). Indeed, Lamont (2002) supposes that forecasters actual loss functions may contain terms in the di¤erence between the forecast and the consensus, as well as conventional accuracy measures such as the absolute forecast error.
The focus of this paper is whether the respondents to the US Survey of Professional Forecasters (US-SPF) take into account the consensus view when they issue their forecasts of US output growth and in ‡ation. Compared to studies such as Lamont (2002) , where the individual forecasters are identi…ed and their track performances are public knowledge, the SPF respondents are anonymous (although each respondent has a unique identi…er, so that individuals can be tracked over time). One might suspect this would weaken the extent to which the forecasters behave strategically, but alternatively if the respondents report the same forecasts to the SPF as they make public through other spheres, these issues remain pertinent. We regard it as a matter that can only be determined by an empirical study. We wish to discover whether herding behaviour depends on the forecast horizon. Forecasters may behave di¤erently when providing their expectations of relatively distant events compared to short-horizon forecasts. In our study the forecast horizons span one-quarter to one-year ahead forecasts. As well as exploring forecast behaviour across di¤erent horizons, we also explore behaviour by type of forecaster, and assess whether forecasters working in …rms characterized as …nancial service providers systematically di¤er from those in non-…nancial service …rms.
The behaviour of the forecasters that take part in the US-SPF is of interest in itself as part of the endeavour to better understand the actual expectations formation process of economic agents, given the pre-eminence of the US-SPF. 1 But in addition of particular interest is whether strategic behaviour is responsible in part for the inconsistencies between the respondents' reported probability distributions and point predictions, as documented by Engelberg, Manski and Williams (2009) and Clements (2009 Clements ( , 2010 .
Testing for herding is not straightforward, as individuals' forecasts will tend to cluster together to the extent that they share the same information irrespective of whether they consider the consensus view when they form their forecasts. The in ‡uential approach of Lamont (2002) does not seek to establish whether forecasters herd or scatter (anti-herd) -i.e., whether they downplay or exaggerate their di¤erences, but tests whether the pattern varies over the forecaster's lifetime. He …nds signi…cant evidence that herding changes as agents age: older forecasters become more radical. Lamont (2002) regresses the absolute di¤erence between each respondent's forecast and the consensus on the age of the forecaster, and the average deviation (as well as individual …xed-e¤ects). Despite the warning that only age-related changes in the pattern of scattering/herding are detectable (when the age variable is found to be statistically signi…cant), some have sought (incorrectly) to make inferences about herding when the age variable is insigni…cant: see Ashiya and Doi (2001) .
We use the non-parametric test of herding of Bernhardt et al. (2006) which does allow for a discrimination between scattering and herding, and has several key advantages, as discussed in section 2. Section 3 describes the forecast data, and section 4 the evidence of whether these forecasters herd or exaggerate their di¤erences. Section 5 describes the inconsistencies between the point predictions and histogram forecasts, and how we test whether these can be explained by herding. Section 6 presents the results, and …nally section 7 concludes.
Testing procedure
Suppose a survey respondent's h-step ahead forecast distribution is given by:
where E h (y ) E (y j h ), and V h (y ) V ar (y j h ). If the forecaster chooses to announce their conditional expectation (E h (y )) as their point prediction, F ;h , then
, and the point forecasts are conditionally (and therefore also unconditionally) unbiased, since E ([y
. Suppose now that the survey respondent herds in the sense that his point prediction is biased towards the consensus forecast. Denote by C ;h the consensus forecast of y available at period h. 2 Hence C ;h 2 h is in the agent's information set by assumption. Herding occurs when the forecaster biases their forecast F ;h away from E h (y ) in the direction of C ;h , whereas 'anti-herding' is when the forecast is moved further away from the consensus forecast relative to the original position. Bernhardt et al. (2006) develop a non-parametric test for herding (and anti-herding) based on the sum of two conditional probabilities: 1) the probability that the reported forecast exceeds the outcome conditional on the forecast exceeding the consensus:
and 2) the probability that the reported forecast is less than the outcome conditional on the forecast being less than the consensus:
Consider the …rst of these. If the forecaster pays no attention to the consensus view, then the probability should be one half assuming that the forecasts are unbiased. If the forecaster herds, then the reported forecast will have been moved downward towards the consensus, and the probability that the forecast exceeds the actual will be less than one half. Anti-herding would result in the probability exceeding a half. The same logic can be applied to the second conditional probability, which will be less than (exceed) one half if there is herding (antiherding). Bernhardt et al. (2006, p.661-3) detail the advantages of basing a test statistic on the average of the two conditional probabilities. Two of the key advantages for macroeconomic forecasting are that the average of the two probabilities will not (incorrectly) suggest herding simply because of i) the occurrence of common or aggregate shocks that a¤ect all forecasters or ii) the presence of systematic bias (unrelated to herding).
Consider the e¤ect of common (unobserved) shocks on the …rst probability, CP 1 . In the absence of herding, Pr (y < F ;h j C ;h < F ;h ) = Pr (y < F ;h ). But if there is a positive shock, Pr (y < F ;h ) < 1 2 . However the second probability CP 2 is then equal to Pr (y > F ;h ) under no herding, and Pr (y > F ;h ) = 1 Pr (y < F ;h ). Hence the average of the two probabilities will not be a¤ected by unforecasted shocks. 2 In what follows the assumption of what is known to the forecaster is shown to play an important role.
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Consider forecast bias not related to herding ((Bernhardt et al. (2006) ) motivate this in the context of analysts'forecasts of company earnings, if earlier forecasts tend to be more optimistic, say). Suppose for example that the forecaster targets the ;h percentile of y , that is, F ;h is set such that Pr (y < F ;h ) = ;h . However, Pr (y > F ;h ) = 1 Pr (y < F ;h ) = 1 ;h so that the average of the two probabilities is one half irrespective of the value of ;h .
Test statistic
Let + = 1 if F > C , and = 1 if F < C (note we have dropped the forecast horizon subscript for notational simplicity). Then de…ne the joint events as + = 1 if F > C and F > y , and = 1 if F < C and F < y . The Bernhardt et al. (2006) test statistic S is calculated as:
which is asymptotically normally distributed N 0:5;
under the null of no herding: that the probability of an over-prediction (under-prediction) is independent of whether F > C (F < C ). Bernhardt et al. (2006) show that the mean is 1 2 under the null of no herding irrespective of whether or not forecasts are biased (i.e., of whether or not Pr(F > y ) = 1 2 ), but that the variance will be over-estimated when forecasts are biased, and also when where the forecast errors are correlated, so that the test statistic will be conservative.
That is, the test will be under-sized so that a rejection of the null is strong evidence against the no-herding null.
Survey Data
The US Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is our source of expectations. The SPF began as the NBER-ASA survey in 1968:4 and runs to the present day. 3 It is a quarterly survey of macroeconomic forecasters of the US economy, eliciting information on point predictions for a number of macro variables as well as the respondents' histograms for in ‡ation and output growth. We use the SPF in conjunction with Real Time Data Set for Macroeconomists (RTDSM) run by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (see Croushore and Stark (2001)) to re-create the data the respondents would have had access to when …ling their survey returns, as described below. 4 Tests of herding are applied to the point predictions of the calendar year annual growth rate of real GDP (i.e., the percentage change between the level of output in year t relative to year t 1) and of the annual in ‡ation rate. For the Q1 surveys, we sum the forecasts of the current quarter and the forecasts of the next three quarters, and divide by the data for the previous year's four quarters, taken from the RTDSM. 5 ; 6 For Q2 surveys the approach is the same except the value for the preceding quarter (Q1) is now data, and similarly for surveys made in the third and fourth quarters of the year. So we have forecasts of annual in ‡ation made in Q1 through to Q4 of the year. For the …rst-quarter surveys the forecast horizon is just under a year, whereas for fourth-quarter surveys it is just under one quarter.
The SPF also provides histograms of annual in ‡ation and output growth in the current year relative to the previous year. The histograms match the point predictions in terms of forecast target (the annual change) and the forecast horizon, and we discuss the use of these forecasts in section 5. There are a number of advantages to using these forecasts for our purposes. Firstly, the forecasts are of the (calendar) year-on-year real GDP growth rate and in ‡ation rate. These are clear, unequivocal measures of activity and prices and forecasts of these measures are very much in the public eye.
Secondly, they have a …xed-event dimension. This means there are multiple forecasts of the same target event made at di¤erent points in time (equivalently, forecasts of the same target 4 Later vintages of data contain revisions and de…nitional changes (see e.g., Landefeld, Seskin and Fraumeni (2008) for a discussion of the revisions to US national accounts data).
5 As of 1981:3, forecasts of the level of the output price for the current year were provided. Summing the quarterly forecasts allows us to use data back to 1968:4. 6 The point forecasts of the growth rate are calculated using the actual data for the previous year from the RTDSM available in the quarter of the survey. The one exception is that the RTDSM for 1996Q1 is missing the value for 1995Q4. In constructing the year-on-year point forecast growth rates for the respondents to the 1996Q1 survey we use the previous-quarter forecasts (of 1995Q4) .
7 Prior to 1981:3 the point predictions for output referred to nominal output, but a series for real output has been imputed (by the Philadelphia Fed) from the forecasts of nominal output and the de ‡ator. The results reported in the paper make use of the imputed real growth forecasts. But probability distributions for real output growth are not given for the period before 1981:Q3. Hence when the computations require both point predictions and histograms the available sample is reduced. In addition, the reliability of the survey data for some survey quarters is questionable. The online documentation provided by the Philadelphia Feb: 'Documentation for the Philadelphia Fed's Survey of Professional Forecasters', http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/. The problematic survey quarters are 1968.4, 1969.4, 1970.4, 1971.4, 1972.3, 1972.4, 1973.4, 1975.4, 1976.4, 1977.4, 1978.4, 1979.2, 1979.3 and 1979.4 for in ‡ation, and 1985.1 and 1986 .1 for both variables.
made at di¤erent horizons). Hence we can use as the consensus for forecasting period at time h an average of the individual forecasts of made in the previous quarter, h 1. It may be reasonable to assume that individual forecasters are aware of the current forecasts made by their fellow forecasters, and produce their forecasts cognizant of the prevailing view, given the media coverage accorded to the forecasts and pronouncements on the current state and likely evolution of key macro indicators. 8 We report the results of calculating the consensus based on last quarter's forecasts and the current quarter's forecasts. The former strategy is more conservative, and we discuss potential problems with the second strategy when we consider the results.
Formally, we let F i ;h+1 = E y j I i; (h+1) denote each individual i's forecast (where i = 1; : : : ; N ) of y made at time (h + 1). We take the consensus to be the cross-sectional median as is commonly done, and denote this by C ;h; 1 , where the ' 1'subscript indicates it is the previous quarter's consensus of y (relative to survey quarter h). The current consensus is denoted C ;h;0 , and we will continue to use C ;h when we do not need to discriminate between the two. The key question of interest remains whether survey respondents'forecasts made at h (of y ) are in ‡uenced by the consensus (either C ;h;0 or C ;h; 1 ).
The SPF allows us to identify forecasters by the industry they work in, beginning with the 1990:Q2 survey onwards. Individuals are classi…ed as either working in a …rm characterized as a …nancial service provider, or a non-…nancial service provider, with a third category for those for whom insu¢ cient information is available to make the designation. A number of papers have considered whether various aspects of forecasters'use of information di¤ers by forecaster 'type'.
For example, Carroll (2003) argues that consumers acquire new information more slowly than professional forecasters, whilst Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) …nd that information acquisition and processing does not di¤er systematically across consumers, …rms, central bankers and professional forecasters. Our comparison between di¤erent 'types'of professional forecasters might be thought less likely to throw up signi…cant di¤erences in behaviour than between consumers and professional forecasters, for example, but nevertheless it is an empirical question whether …nancial and non-…nancial forecasters'herding behaviour di¤ers.
In addition to the point forecasts of the calendar year annual growth rates, the probability distribution forecasts of these same quantities (expressed in the form of probabilities of in ‡ation (say) lying in certain pre-speci…ed intervals) allows us to calculate higher forecast moments of these two variables. There is no reason in principle to con…ne an investigation of herding to …rst moments: if survey respondents are uncertain about the uncertainty surrounding their central projections, they might well take a lead from the consensus level of uncertainty (as given in the previous quarter's aggregate histogram, for example, or as the average of the individual respondents'forecast standard deviations). However the approach to testing for herding requires actual values against which the forecasts can be compared. Estimates of the actual values of conditional variances or standard deviations could be obtained from squared forecast errors or realized variance measures using higher-frequency data, 9 but we do not consider these issues here, and instead con…ne our attention to …rst moment estimates for which actual values are readily available.
Empirical …ndings: Evidence of herding when SPF respondents report their point predictions
The results are shown in table 1. Consider the results when we use the current consensus,
The results suggest anti-herding: forecasters deliberately move their reported forecasts further from the consensus, that is, they exaggerate the di¤erence between their forecast and the consensus. This is true of both in ‡ation and output growth, and holds at all forecast horizons: 1-year ahead, down to 1-quarter ahead. 10 The lower bound on the statistic (1) in all cases exceeds one half, indicating that the …nding is statistically signi…cant (in a two-sided test at the 5% level). Across all horizons, the sum of the two probabilities is 0:68 for in ‡ation, and 0:64 for output growth.
When the consensus is calculated from the previous quarter's forecasts, C ;h; 1 , the sums of the conditional probabilities are generally closer to a half, suggesting the SPF respondents pay less attention to the gap between their current forecasts and the lagged consensus when setting their current forecasts. Nevertheless, for in ‡ation we still reject the null in favour of anti-herding for the second and third quarter forecasts, and interestingly, …nd evidence of herding at the shortest horizons (corresponding to the fourth quarter surveys). For output growth there is also evidence of anti-herding in responding to the second and third quarter surveys, but again, clear evidence of herding at the shortest horizon.
The results for the previous quarter's consensus provide the more conservative test of (anti-)herding. They may under-estimate each forecaster's knowledge of the views of others: failure to reject the non-herding null might simply re ‡ect the fact that the lagged consensus is out-dated information. But by the same token, these results are unlikely to falsely indicate a dependence on the views of others by overstating the forecaster's information set.
The results for the lagged consensus suggest that herding behaviour depends on the forecast horizon. For forecasting both variables, there is a tendency to move towards the consensus for the shortest horizon (one-quarter ahead), but at longer horizons forecasters tend to exaggerate their di¤erences. There is a literature on the dispersion of forecasters'expectations, and how this varies with the forecast horizon (see Lahiri and Sheng (2008) and Patton and Timmermann (2010) , inter alia). For example, Patton and Timmermann (2010) show that dispersion is greater at longer horizons. Our …ndings on herding are broadly consistent with these patterns, but we leave a more formal analysis of herding and disagreement for future research. Tables 2 and 3 report results separately for forecasters who can be characterized as working for …nancial services …rms and for non-…nancial services …rms, for the sub-sample of surveys from 1990:Q2 for which identi…cation of forecaster type is possible. The results for both in ‡ation and output growth suggest that the di¤erences between the two types of forecaster are everywhere small so that there is no evidence that the two di¤er in terms of their herding behaviour.
5 Herding and forecast inconsistencies Engelberg et al. (2009 ) and Clements (2009 , 2010 compare the point predictions of the US SPF respondents with the histogram forecasts. They report inconsistencies between some of the pairs of forecasts. Of interest is whether the evidence of anti-herding we …nd (as reported in section 4) explains the inconsistencies between the di¤erent types of forecasts. We …rst update and explain the evidence on inconsistencies, and then provide an assessment of whether (anti-)herding o¤ers an explanation.
To assess the evidence for inconsistencies, we use the non-parametric bounds approach of Engelberg et al. (2009) to determine whether each pair of histogram and point forecasts is consistent, in the following sense. We calculate whether the point forecast is consistent with a given measure of central tendency of the histogram (such as the mean) using only the information provided in the histogram: that is, without introducing any auxiliary assumptions about how the histogram relates to the underlying subjective probability distribution. We calculate upper and lower bounds on the moments from the histogram to determine whether the point prediction is consistent with that moment of the underlying subjective distribution: 1) the probability that the reported point prediction (F ) exceeds the histogram moment (which we take to be the mean, ) conditional on the point prediction exceeding the consensus,
and, 2) the probability that the reported point prediction is less than the histogram mean conditional on the forecast being less than the consensus,
Relative to CP 1 and CP 2 we have simply replaced the actual values by the histogram means. Unlike the bounds approach to assessing forecast inconsistencies, we now need point estimates of the histogram means. We consider two ways of calculating the histogram means:
we estimate the means directly (by assuming the probability mass is uniform within each interval (equivalently, lies at the midpoint) as well as …tting a parametric distribution to the points on the distribution identi…ed by the histogram. When there is a large di¤erence in the probability mass attached to adjacent intervals, it might be thought desirable to attach higher probabilities to points in the lower interval near the boundary with the high probability interval:
this is facilitated by …tting a parametric distribution. Rather than …tting a normal distribution with the assumption of symmetry, we follow Engelberg et al. (2009) Notice that we suppose that if herding does take place it is based on a comparison of the point prediction with the consensus point prediction (not the consensus mean forecast). This assumption re ‡ects the greater visibility of the point predictions (these are recorded in the survey) whereas the mean forecasts are implicit in the reported histograms.
Suppose that there are aggregate shocks. The probability that F ;h > ;h is less likely to be a¤ected by unexpected aggregate shocks than the probability that F ;h > y , because both the point prediction and the histogram mean will both fail to re ‡ect the shock. However, if there are information rigidities which a¤ect the two types of forecasts di¤erently, then in response to a sequence of positive shocks (say) the point predictions would exceed the means, if it were the case that the point predictions are updated more frequently. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) provide a recent discussion of information rigidities. By summing the two conditional probabilities CP 1 and CP 2 we obtain a test statistic which will not reject simply because of informational rigidities. To see this, suppose Pr F ;h > ;h j C ;h < F ;h = Pr ;h < F ;h (i.e., no herding), but Pr F ;h > ;h > 1 2 , say, assuming a sequence of positive shocks and more frequent updating of F ;h relative to ;h . But then Pr F ;h < ;h = 1 Pr F ;h > ;h so the average probability will still be equal to 1 2 under the null. Suppose the point predictions are biased for reasons other than herding, such as the point prediction being optimal for an asymmetric loss function. 11 If we let F ;h = ;h + x ;h , then under some assumptions,
, where h is a constant which depends on the distribution function of the data and the loss function, and V h (y ) is the conditional variance:
see Patton and Timmermann (2007, Proposition 2) . Clements (2010 Clements ( , 2013 investigate whether asymmetric loss accounts for the inconsistencies reported in table 4, but …nd little support for the contention. Our interest here is whether (anti-) herding explains the inconsistencies, and whether we can use the testing approach in section 2 to test this hypothesis in the presence of asymmetric loss. It turns out we can: it is straightforward to establish that the sum of the conditional probabilities CP 1 and CP 2 will be one half irrespective of whether loss is asymmetric.
Under the null -that herding on the consensus point predictions does not explain the sign of the gap between the individuals' point predictions and mean forecasts -the conditional probability CP 1 is simply Pr F ;h > ;h which is equal to Pr (x ;h > 0). Now, Pr (x ;h > 0) S 1 2 depending on whether h S 0, where h 6 = 0 when the costs of under-and over-prediction are di¤erent. However, under the null CP 2 is Pr F ;h < ;h = Pr (x ;h < 0) = 1 Pr (x ;h > 0),
2 irrespective of the degree and direction of the asymmetry in the loss function.
6 Does herding explain forecast inconsistencies? Table 5 shows that the null (that the S-type statistic equals a half) is rejected at the 5% level for the second and third quarter survey forecasts for both output and in ‡ation, indicating that -at all but the shortest horizon -the discrepancies between the point predictions and means are systematically related to herding of the point predictions on the consensus. These results are for last quarter's consensus, which may be more reliable for the reasons given in section 4, but both sets of results are recorded and are largely the same.
Consider the constituent probabilities for in ‡ation for the second-quarter survey forecasts.
The probability CP 1 = Pr F ;h > ;h j C ;h < F ;h is 0:37, suggesting the probability of reporting a pessimistic point prediction (relative to the forecast of the histogram mean) is less than a half. The probability CP 2 = Pr F ;h < ;h j C ;h > F ;h is 0:77, suggesting optimistic point predictions are more likely than not when the point forecast is below the consensus (point) forecast. Given that we have shown that optimistic point predictions out-number pessimistic forecasts 4:1 for in ‡ation (see table 4), these …ndings do not come as a surprise. They are consistent with (say) a series of supply-side shocks which reduce in ‡ation, and with slower updating of the histogram forecasts relative to the point predictions. However, the fact that the average of the two probabilities is signi…cantly di¤erent from one half suggests that this is not the whole story: we reject the hypothesis that respondents pay no heed to the consensus view when they determine their forecasts. The fact that the test statistic exceeds one half indicates 'anti-herding'. In our context, this suggests that negative gaps (where the gap is F ;h ;h ) are exacerbated when the point prediction is low relative to the consensus.
For output growth the overall S-statistics are similar, and signi…cantly in excess of one half for the longer horizon forecasts, but the CP 1 probabilities are now in excess of one half, consistent with the point predictions tending to be more optimistic (i.e., higher) than the means.
Nevertheless, the conclusion is the same as that for in ‡ation: signi…cant test outcomes indicate the inconsistencies are related to (anti-)herding behaviour.
Conclusions
Our …ndings present clear evidence that US-SPF participants …le their forecasts aware of, and in ‡uenced by, the forecasts of others. The degree and nature of the imitative behaviour depends on the forecast horizon. Forecasters tend to herd at the shortest horizons (one quarter ahead) but tend to exaggerate their di¤erences at longer forecast horizons. That herding behaviour may be horizon-speci…c is a novel …nding, and suggests that such behaviour may contribute to the observed pattern of forecaster disagreement varying with the forecast horizon. We …nd no evidence that professional forecasters working in the …nancial services provider sector di¤er from those in the non-…nancial services sector in terms of the extent to which they herd.
We use the test for herding of Bernhardt et al. (2006) , which was originally applied to assess the behaviour of professional …nancial analysts, but has recently been applied more widely, including to macroeconomic forecasting (see, Pierdzioch, Rülke and Stadtmann (2010) and Pierdzioch and Rülke (2012) , inter alia). This approach often suggests anti-herding: that forecasters exaggerate their di¤erences. For both output growth and in ‡ation we reject the null of no herding in favour of an 'imitation e¤ect'for the shortest horizon forecasts.
Having established that both types of herding behaviour are a feature of our set of annual calendar year forecasts, we then explore whether herding is able to explain a puzzle in the forecasting literature: that some forecasters probability distributions and point predictions of in ‡ation and output growth are inconsistent. We adapt the Bernhardt et al. (2006) test to assess whether the probability of a forecaster issuing a point prediction which exceeds (say) the implied mean of a forecast probability distribution depends upon the consensus point predictions. Except at the shortest forecast horizon, there is evidence that discrepancies between point predictions and implied-mean forecasts are exacerbated by anti-herding behaviour, matching the results from the standard application of the test. The Q1 surveys of 1985 and 1986 are excluded as the Philadelphia Fed has documented possible problems with the forecast distributions in these surveys. The point forecasts of the growth rate are calculated using the actual data for the previous year from the RTDSM available in the quarter of the survey. The one exception is that the RTDSM for 1996Q1 is missing the value for 1995Q4. In constructing the year-on-year point forecast growth rates for the respondents to the 1996Q1 survey we use the previous-quarter forecasts (of 1995Q4) .
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There are missing observations for the histograms for a number of surveys, because respondents were mistakenly asked about the wrong year in those surveys. See the online documentation provided by the Philadelphia Feb: 'Documentation for the Philadelphia Fed's Survey of Professional Forecasters', http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/. The problematic survey quarters are 1985Q1, 1986Q1, 1968Q4, 1969Q4, 1970Q4, 1971Q4, 1972Q3, 1972Q4, 1973Q4, 1975Q4, 1976Q4, 1977Q4, 1978Q4, 1979Q2, 1979Q3, 1979Q4 . That these are predominantly Q4 surveys accounts for the smaller number of respondents to Q4 surveys in the table. The calculation of l and r depends on the distribution of probability across the histogram intervals. Suppose probability is only attached to interior intervals, and to illustrate, let t 1 ; : : : ; t 10 denote the right endpoints of the histogram intervals, so that F (t 1 ) ; ; : : : ; F (t 10 ) are points on the individual's CDF. We then set l and r equal to the left and right endpoints of the intervals with positive probability. Suppose we have (say) F (t 5 ) = 0, F (t 6 ) = 0:2, F (t 7 ) = 0:7, and F (t 8 ) = 1. Then l = t 5 , r = t 8 . Then we minimize only over a and b:
[Beta (t i ; a; b; t 5 ; t 8 ) F (t i )] 2 :
If there is mass in either outer interval, then we need to make an assumption about l and in the lower tail interval, then we allow the support to extend below the left endpoint of the lower interval, and l is a free parameter (similarly r if probability is assigned to the upper tail interval. For example, if F (t 1 ) = 0:2, F (t 2 ) = 0:5, F (t 3 ) = 0:7, and F (t 4 ) = 1, so there is a 20% chance that in ‡ation will be less than t When X Beta (a; b; l; r), the …rst moments is given by:
When probability is assigned to fewer bins, the histogram less clearly reveals the individual's underlying subjective distribution. Formally, we are unable to …t the generalized beta distribution when there are fewer than three bins with non-zero probabilities. For 1 and 2-bin histograms we follow Engelberg et al. (2009) and …t triangular distribution, which provide symmetric representations of the underlying distributions.
1 2 This is closely related to, but not identical to, Engelberg et al. (2009, eqn. 3, p.38.) 
